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ABSTRACT 
Since the Petersberg Conference in 2001 Germany has been involved in the police building in 
Afghanistan. From 2001 until EUPOL Afghanistan took over responsibility in June 2007 
Germany was the Lead /Key Partner Nation for police reform. During this time the German 
Police Project Office (GPPO) was in place, which switched over to German Police Project 
Team (GPPT) in June 2007. In addition to EUPOL Afghanistan the GPPT is the current 
bilateral project organisation where the German police officers are deployed.  
The purpose of this paper is to point out the German experiences working in the above 
mentioned structures/organisations for police reform of the Afghan police forces. 
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Introduction 
When the Taliban regime fell Afghanistan had suffered from more than two decades of war. 
There was no functioning government, no economy to speak of and no infrastructure in 
evidence. The people of Afghanistan were torn between their loyalty to different ethnic 
groups, to warlords and potentates, to the Russians or to the Taliban. Under these conditions 
the International Community started their support in order to help rebuilding Afghanistan and 
to help the people of Afghanistan to become one nation again. 
To reach these goals establishing a safe situation in the country was a first priority. 
Due to a long tradition of supporting the Afghan police Germany, as the so-called Lead 
Nation, took over this task to assist the reform and reconstruction of the Afghan police forces. 
The beginning was very complicated because there was practically no police left after the 
Taliban regime. An excerpt from a fact-finding report written by a German delegation reveals 
this situation: 
"The police force is in a deplorable state just a few months after the dissolution of the Taliban 
regime. There is a total lack of equipment and supplies. No systematic training has been 
provided for around 20 years. At least one entire generation of trained police officers is 
missing. Next to constables, former Northern Alliance fighters are being put to work as police 
officers.“ 
In the following I want to give a comprehensive overview about the German efforts and the 
environment in which this task had to be dealt with. This document is not an official German 
statement: it is rather a compilation of facts and figures merged with my own experiences in 
Afghanistan, at the CPCC/Council of the European Union and my present responsibility to 
manage the training for German police officers who want to serve in Afghanistan.
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1. The Petersberg Conference 
The first international conference on Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime was held 
on the Petersberg, close to Bonn, from November 27, 2001 to December 5, 2001. During this 
conference the international community agreed on the political and economic reconstruction 
of Afghanistan and on the steps leading to free and democratic elections. The results of the 
conference offered the Afghan people the opportunity to rebuild their social and political life.  
Lead .ation System 
On the security sector it has been decided to divide the responsibilities and to assign special 
task to the so-called Lead Nations. There are five Lead Nations with following 
responsibilities: 
1. Japan – Disarmament, Demilitarisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
2. Italy - Justice  
3. Germany – Police 
4. United Kingdom – combating drugs (counter narcotics) 
5. United States of America – Army 
This division of labour does not mean that only the Lead Nation works in its area of 
responsibility, in fact the Lead Nation has the duty to coordinate all efforts in the assigned 
scope of duties. 
This division of responsibilities seemed to be logical but in reality it has caused some 
problems. In the beginning the Lead Nations tried to transfer their national systems, such as 
the German police system and the Italian justice system, to the Afghan authorities but there 
was the problem that these systems are barely compatible. However, transferring a western 
democratic system on an Islamic culture cannot be done on a one to one basis.  
Furthermore the division of the tasks has lead to two completely separate systems regarding 
rebuilding the police and counter narcotics. Counter narcotics emerged as an independent 
police with an independent prosecution and a special jurisdiction. That is the reason why there 
has been almost no information flow and no coordination between the counter narcotics 
police and the other branches of the police. But without coordination between the Counter 
Narcotics Police (CNPA), the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) and the Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) it is not possible to fight organized, border crossing crime. 
This may be one reason why drug-related crime is still not under control. 
The Lead Nation system is still in place but the Lead Nations have been called Key Partner 
Nations since the London Conference in January 2006 and EUPOL Afghanistan took over the 
task from Germany in 2007. The International Community (IC) noticed the lack of co-
ordination and tried different systems to solve the issue but this task has not been finished yet. 
Way to democratic elections 
The inauguration of the first Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) took place on December 22, 
2001. The AIA got a six-month mandate and comprised 30 members headed by the chairman 
Hamid Karzai. The members and the Chairman had not been elected but appointed by the 
international community to stabilise the country and give the nation an Afghan led authority 
at the very beginning. 
The Transitional Authority (TA) followed the Afghan Interim Authority. The members of the 
National Loya Dschirga, which took place from June 12 to June 19, 2002, elected the TA. The 
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President of the TA was Hamid Karzai.  
A Loya Dschirga to work out a constitution was convened at the end of 2003. The new 
Afghan Constitution was ratified in January 2004. 
The Presidential Election took place on October 9, 2004. Hamid Karzai became the first 
President of Afghanistan to be elected in the first free and democratic elections for decades. 
There was a long gap between the Presidential and the Parliamentary Election because the 
Parliamentary election had to be postponed several times. It took almost one year to organise 
and accomplish the election of the Afghan Parliament. Now the whole Afghan Government 
was elected freely and democratically. 
 
2. The London Conference and the Afghanistan Compact 
The Petersberg Conference was followed by several conferences to coordinate the 
international efforts and to finance the international aid (see Annex 1 Chronology). Three 
international donor conferences took place in Tokyo, Berlin and Geneva in 2002. All of the 
conferences aimed at fulfilling the roadmap agreed on at Petersberg Conference. But the 
London Conference from January 31 to February 1, 2006 represented the end of the 
Petersberg process. During the conference the Afghanistan Compact was launched as a result 
of consultations between the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), the United Nations (UN) 
and the International Community (IC). 
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board  
The Afghanistan Compact established a mechanism to coordinate Afghan and international 
efforts over the following five years. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) 
was implemented to give an overall strategic coordination to the Afghanistan Compact. The 
JCMB is composed of 7 representatives from the GoA and 21 representatives of the IC. The 
Board is co-chaired by the Senior Economic Advisor to the President and the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan. It is constituted for a period of five 
years from April 2006 to March 2011. 
The three specific objectives of the JCMB are: 
• Provide high-level political support for the Afghanistan Compact, 
• Provide direction to address significant issues of coordination, implementation, 
financing for the bench-marks and timelines in the Afghanistan Compact and any 
other obstacles identified either by the GoA or the IC, 
• Report on the implementation of the Compact to the President, National Assembly, 
UN Secretary General, the donors and the public. 
Afghan .ational Development Strategy 
The main outcome of the London Conference was the Afghan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS). The international community agreed to support the Afghan government’s 
development strategy and the Afghan government took responsibility for the development 
process in order to meet the national goals. 
The ANDS is an Afghan Government medium-term development framework that sets the 
social, economic, governance and security agendas for Afghanistan over five years.
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The two important functions of the ANDS are: 
• Presenting the nation and international community with a comprehensive study of 
development priorities and a unified strategy (all ministries and state agencies) and 
 
• Synchronizing strategies between different ministries by being a central planning 
document and helping to bring efficiency in projects and programs. 
The ANDS has 3 Pillars: 
• Security 
- National Defence 
- Internal Security and Law Enforcement 
- Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups 
- De-Mining 
- Counter Narcotics 
• Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights 
- Empowerment of National Assembly 
- Justice/Rule of Law 
- Religious Affairs 
- Public Administration Reform 
- Human Rights and Women’s Rights 
• Economic and Social Development 
The security pillar - and within it the item “Internal Security and Law Enforcement”- is the 
most important one for the police reform. But not only security is in the focus of the German 
police reform aid. The “Justice and Rule of Law”, “Public Administration Reform” and 
“Human Rights and Women’s Rights” are also focal points within the Governance, Rule of 
Law and Human Rights pillar. Because of their overlapping in many fields these items are 
inseparable from the police. 
The ANDS provides benchmarks which help to define goals and serve as a tool to control the 
development. Two examples for benchmarks from the security pillar are, 
• ‘By end-2010, a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced 
Afghan National Police and Afghan National Border Police with a combined force of 
up to 82,000 (62.000 until March 2007) will be able to meet the security needs of the 
country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable. 
• By end-1389 (20 March 2011): Government machinery (including the number of 
ministries) will be restructured and rationalized to ensure a fiscally sustainable public 
administration. The civil service commission will be strengthened; and civil service 
functions will be reformed to reflect core functions and responsibilities. ‘ 
For sure, both these goals will not be reached by end of 2010 respectively 2011. There are 
other goals that will not be reached either. Most of the benchmarks are pending.  
Therefore, the IC the UN and the GoA held a second London Conference on January 28, 2010 
to update the ANDS and to agree on measures to help the GoA to reach the nations goals.  
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3. German Police Project Office 
Lead .ation for the reconstruction of the Afghan police 
In 2002, on request of the Afghan Interim Government and the United Nations, Germany took 
over the responsibility for the international coordination of the reconstruction of the Afghan 
police forces. During the second Donor Conference in Berlin on March 13, 2002 the German 
Federal Government decided to set up a project office to rebuild the Afghan police forces. 
Basis for the work of the project office was the Seat and Status Agreement from March 15, 
2002 signed by the German Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Interior of the Interim 
Government of Afghanistan. This Agreement set up a police project office and promised to 
grant training assistance and equipment aid for the Afghan police forces. The German Police 
Project Office (GPPO) commenced its work on April 3, 2002. 
Personnel and tasks 
On the basis of the Seat and Status Agreement, which was last renewed on October 23, 2006, 
the tasks of the GPPO were: 
• Advising the Afghan security authorities in an effort to rebuild an Afghan police force 
which is bound by rule-of-law principles and has a respect for human rights, and on 
combating drug cultivation, drug processing and drug trafficking, 
• Assisting in the training of police recruits in the light of the principles mentioned 
above,  
• Assisting in the setting up of a police academy,  
• Implementing bilateral police funding assistance and  
• Co-ordinating the international support for the establishment  
of the Afghan police force. 
The GPPO started in 2002 with a team of about 10 German police officers from the German 
Federal Police (Bundespolizei), Federal Investigation Department (Bundeskriminalamt) and 
from the State Police Forces (Länderpolizeien). When the GPPO closed on June 15, 2007 and 
passed into German Police Project Team (GPPT), it had a staff of about 45 police officers. On 
average 40 police officers were deployed as long-term experts and additionally about 25-30 
each year as short-term experts providing basic, advanced and specialised training. 
A project group at the Federal Ministry of the Interior in Berlin supported the GPPO. 
Deployment 
The GPPO Headquarters was located in Kabul but German police officers were also deployed 
to field offices in Herat (until the end of 2005) and in those provinces where the German 
military (Bundeswehr) provided a safe environment for their work.  
The outposts of the GPPO headquarters in Kunduz and Feyzabad were located on the 
premises of the German Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The focus of their work 
was the implementation of training and providing equipment aid as well as in mentoring the 
local police command. 
Another outpost of the GPPO was in Mazar-e Sharif, the seat of the German led Regional 
Command North of ISAF. Among other things, the coordination and the steering of police 
work in the north of the country as well as training for the different branches of the Afghan 
police, equipment aid and the coordination of international police advisers working in the 
north of the country were provided from there. A very important task was the mentoring of 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                                                      Discussion Paper: 10-02 
 
 
8 
the regional police commander, who is responsible for nine provinces. 
Main results of GPPO’s work 
Police Academy  
The Police Academy Kabul had been completely rebuilt by the Federal Agency for Technical 
Relief (THW) before it reopened on August 24, 2002. In a ceremony attended by President 
Karzai the Police Academy was handed over to the Afghan Government. 
Police officers of the GPPO in cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Interior developed a 
completely new concept for training and further education, including regulations concerning 
the composition of the student body and the exams as well as the development of the curricula 
for all AFG police officers. The Police Academy provides high quality training for Saran 
(police officers), who study for three years, and Satanman (non-commissioned police officers 
at group leader level), studying for 9 month.  
About 4,500 police officers have graduated from the Academy since its re-opening until the 
handover to EUPOL Afghanistan by the GPPO.  
The Police Academy in Kabul is a German flagship project because after a short time of 
reconstruction, training conducted by German police officers and ‘train the trainer courses’ 
for Afghan teachers, the academy passed over into Afghan ownership. After the handover the 
GPPO mentored the Academy’s leadership and teachers and accomplished several advanced 
and specialised courses with German experts. 
Training of patrol officers, Satoonkai 
While Germany focused on the police leadership, the US trained the patrol officers, the 
Satoonkai in the Police Training Centres (PTC) all over Afghanistan. These two different 
approaches are complementary and therefore do not compete with each other.  
The patrol officers get an 8-week basic training and they should get additional advanced 
trainings after serving for a while. But in most of the cases this never happens. The US trained 
a huge number of patrol officers but a lot of them left the police shortly after completing their 
training to work for security companies, private persons and in the worst case for the Taliban 
because all of them pay much better wages. Unfortunately most of them take along their 
equipment including the weapons. Only better payment of the police and social incentives like 
a functioning health system for the police officers and their families can solve this problem. 
Further education 
The GPPO also focused on advanced and specialised courses of Afghan police officers. Some 
examples of courses: 
• Training for Afghan National Civil Order Police (former Stand-by Police), 
• Basic and advanced training for the Quick-Reaction Forces, a special unit of the 
Afghan National Border Police (ANBP), 
• Identification of document falsifications, 
• Aviation security, 
• Criminal investigation technology, 
• Counter-narcotics training, 
• Dealing with traffic accidents, 
• Workshops for high-rank police officers, together with the Norwegian police 
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contingent, 
• Leadership training, 
• Train the Trainer courses for specialised tasks within different police branches. 
Since 2005 the German military police have supported the basic training of Afghan police 
officers in the Northern provinces. The training included how to conduct patrols, map reading 
and some other basic skills. 
All training courses were also used to identify capable students who later might become 
trainers themselves. The idea behind this was to handover training into Afghan responsibility 
as soon as possible.  
Equipment and construction 
The equipment and construction aid for the Afghan police forces were a major task for the 
GPPO. In the beginning the Afghan police forces needed basic police equipment like 
uniforms, personal equipment, office equipment and police vehicles. Furthermore the GPPO 
focused on the basic infrastructure for the Afghan Police forces in particular police buildings 
for different levels of the organisation like police posts, stations and Headquarters. One of the 
main reconstruction projects was the Police Academy as a precondition to the start of police 
training. 
After the basic requirements had been achieved the projects became more and more complex 
and cross-linked with projects of other actors in the field of police reform. This required a 
close co-operation and co-ordination in particular with the US led Combined Security 
Transitional Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and also with other bilateral projects like 
those from Norway, Canada and Japan and international donors. 
Examples for equipment projects: 
• Police cars, motorbikes, buses, 
• Traffic Police Equipment, 
• Maintenance vehicles, 
• Aviation security equipment for Kabul international Airport, Herat und Masar-e Sharif  
(x-ray machines, walk through metal scanners, hand-held metal detectors), 
• Radios, Repeaters, 
• Computers and software, 
• Uniforms and personal equipment, 
• Investigation and forensic equipment, 
• Equipment for document checks, 
• Equipping of training facilities. 
Examples for re-construction/construction projects 
• National Police Academy, 
• Headquarters for the Afghan National Border Police,  
• Dog training centre Border Police Head Quarters, 
• Border Crossing Points (e.g. street to Border Crossing Point Islam Qualah), 
• Headquarters for the Highway Police,  
• Police stations for the Highway Police, 
• Headquarters for the Traffic Police,  
• Several headquarters for the Kabul City Police and  
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provincial Police Headquarters, 
• Counter-Terrorism Department and its sub-offices, 
• Counter Narcotics Training Unit. 
Mentoring and Advising 
The Mentoring and advising capacities of the GPPO grew up with the strength of the project 
office. Mentoring and advising became an evermore important tool towards the reform of the 
police.  
While the operational support like training, equipment and construction projects is time 
limited and shows an immediate success, mentoring and advising are long term measures 
which are not easy to control and to evaluate. The acting police officers need to be 
professional in their respective field of policing. Furthermore, mentoring and advising require 
a high level of personal and intercultural competence. It needs a long time to build up a 
trustful relationship between mentee and mentor. Therefore it is not effective if the mentor 
changes every few months which is exactly what happens if military personnel is used, 
especially if they are deployed for only a short time. Very often there is a gap between two 
mentors. If there is no overlapping time, the leaving mentor can’t introduce the new mentor to 
his mentee and there is no transfer of knowledge.  
In accordance with the “Mentoring and Advising Concept” developed by the GPPO and 
evaluated in July 2006, 22 top officials of the MoI, including Minister Ahmad Zarar Moqbel, 
and from the different branches of the Afghan police force in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz 
and Feyzabad received personal mentoring from German police officers in 2007. In addition 
to that, several international mentors and police advisers gave advice to officials in key 
positions. The goal was to standardise policing procedures so that the efficiency of leaders in 
the field of policing would increase. The mentors were also tasked with the further 
development and the supervision of the implementation of the organizational reforms.  
The GPPO and CSTC-A focused on the MoI. In the beginning of the US efforts to support the 
police reform there was some overlapping in mentoring and advising. Some high-ranking 
Afghan officials had a German and a US mentor and sometimes even more from other 
bilateral projects or international organisations. This was like a ‘mentoring overkill’. But in 
the end the International Community noticed the problems that emerged from this situation 
and the mentor co-ordination became better. Nowadays there are common mentoring plans 
which co-ordinate most of the international mentors. These days the main players in 
mentoring and advising the police are EUPOL Afghanistan and CSTC-A/NTM-A.  
Organisational reform for the AFG police forces 
GPPO and the Afghan Ministry of Interior developed, supported by other international 
partners, a comprehensive organizational reform concept for the Afghan police forces, the so-
called Tashkeel. This concept was agreed to by President Karzai in December 2005. It 
includes a “Pay and Rank Reform” to bring the salaries of police officers up to the level of 
military personnel and to improve the efficiency of the police by reducing the number of top 
officers. In a first step 31 top-level generals (three and two stars) were recruited; in the next 
step another 86 positions were filled with one star generals. 
 A few months after the selection of the generals the Minister of Interior exchanged several 
generals or moved them to other functions or provinces. Unfortunately there has been no 
vetting or assessment centre for the new generals replacing them. This made it more 
complicated to monitor the Tashkeel process and it hampered somewhat the organisational 
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reform efforts.  
The third step had been completed about one year later. It concerned the appointment of 
another 1,000 police leaders at the next lower level. 
At that time the Tashkeel contained a total number of 62,000 police officers in the Afghan 
police forces, including the Afghan National Border Police. 
As a result of the JCMB-meeting in January 2007 a task force to assess the required police 
strength was set up under the leadership of the German Ambassador at Large for Police 
Reform. This led to the decision to increase the number to 82,000 officers, a number that has 
been confirmed on the JCMB meeting on May 1, 2007. 
Another important part of the organisational reform was the re-organisation of the Afghan 
National Border Police (ANBP). The ANBP was organised in 8 brigades whereas the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) were organised in 5 Regional 
Commands. This overlapping in the areas of responsibility caused many problems in the 
communication and co-ordination of police operations. Therefore, the ANBP were re-
organised with 5 Border Police Zones, identical to the areas of responsibilities of the ANP and 
ANA. Furthermore, the Border Police Zone HQs were co-located with the Regional 
Commands depending on availability of space inside the facilities.  
International cooperation and coordination 
Cooperation with partners from Germany 
The GPPO played an important part in the German comprehensive approach to the 
development of Afghanistan. It necessitated close cooperation between four German 
Ministries. Joint projects were undertaken together with the Technisches Hilfswerk (THW, 
Agency for Technical Relief), the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the German Embassy 
in Kabul and the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, Company for Technical 
Cooperation). To support the co-ordination efforts the German Federal Foreign Office 
implemented an Ambassador at Large for Police Reform. 
Cooperation with international partners 
There was also a close working relationship with AFG partners, as well as other international 
partners like 
• ISAF 
• CSTC-A 
• UNAMA, UNDC, UNDP, UNOPS 
• EU/EUSR, EC 
• Other embassies, 
• Bilateral Projects of other countries (e.g. Japan, Canada, Norway), 
• GOs and NGOs  
The USA was with respect to their financial and personnel resources the most important ally 
of the GPPO.  In a lot of projects there was a close cooperation with the US, mainly with 
CSTC-A that belongs to the US Department of Defence but also with the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) that belongs to the Department of 
State. 
Coordination of police reform efforts 
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Coordination was done according to the so-called pillar system with an Executive Committee 
on the policy level, the Interagency Police Coordinating Action Group (IPCAG) on 
diplomatic level and the Police Reform Steering Group on the strategic level.  While the 
Executive Committee had never been operational, the IPCAG met on regular basis and was 
the highest coordination level at that time. The IPCAC was co-chaired by the German 
Ambassador at Large and the Head of the GPPO. It consisted of representatives of the GoA, 
Embassies and organisations involved in the police reform e.g. CSTC-A. 
At the operational level there were the following 7 pillars: 
• MoI Reform (CSTC-A) 
• Sustainment (CSTC-A) 
• Training (GPPO) 
• Border Police (GPPO) 
• Uniform Police (GPPO) 
• Investigation Police (GPPO) 
• Field Mentors (CSTC-A) 
The different pillars were chaired by the GPPO or the US. Every pillar had its own structure 
depending on its respective tasks.  
To avoid the doubling of projects and thus a waste of money coordination of donations was 
another important task of the GPPO. Even if the GPPO had only a small budget many 
complex and expensive projects could be realised by a working donor-coordination. 
The pillar system had some shortfalls. The different pillars didn’t work in the same way and 
with the same quality. From time to time single pillars didn’t work at all, depending on the 
acting persons. If there was no overlapping of positions organisational structures and 
knowledge got lost. Furthermore, the coordination between the pillars was complicated 
because there was no common structure. 
Therefore, there was a strong need to improve the international co-ordination. 
  
Dubai-Conferences for international police reform coordination 
On invitation of the USA Embassy in Kabul and under the chairmanship of the GPPO two 
conferences of police experts working on the reconstruction of the AFG police took place in 
Dubai. These conferences were police conferences at the strategic level. The goal was to 
improve the coordination of the police reform on the ground and to minimize the problems 
regarding the pillar system. 
The Dubai I-Conference took place in April 2006 and set the basis for a new way of 
international coordination. 
The Dubai II-Conference was a followed-up conference on the first. The 26 participants from 
12 countries and ISAF agreed on a structure for closer cooperation. The most important part 
was the idea of an “International Police Coordination Board (IPCB)” that was to harmonize 
the international efforts regarding the development of the Afghan police. The IPCB was to 
replace the three-pillar structure because of some shortfalls in coordination. 
In the following weeks a working group under the leadership of GPPO developed the IPCB 
model. The EU Fact-Finding Mission took over this model and the IPCB started to work with 
EUPOL Afghanistan.  
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In the IPCB model the IPCB should be the decision making body that directs tasks to the 
IPCB Secretariat (working body). All the important actors involved in the police reform and 
the Afghan MoI should have a seat. In fact it was almost the same like the former IPCAG of 
the pillar structure. What was new was the idea to have a permanent working body (IPCB 
Secretariat), which was manned by staff from all actors involved in the police reform. The 
biggest contributors EUPOL AFG and CSTC-A as well as the GoA were to contribute most 
of the staff and equipment.  
But for various reasons this model has never worked well. There has always been a problem 
with insufficient staffing, caused maybe by the misunderstanding that the IPCB Secretariat 
was a part of EUPOL Afghanistan and not an independent working body. It seemed that some 
partners were afraid to put their staff under EUPOL command because the IPCB was co-
located with EUPOL Afghanistan. But in 2008 the IPCB moved to a separated compound to 
increase its capacity and underline its independence from the EU mission.  
The IPCB model has changed several times but it still exists. The new NATO Training 
Mission - Afghanistan is going to use the IPCB to coordinate its efforts with the IC. This 
could strengthen its role to co-ordinate the international efforts to reform the Afghan police 
forces.  
However, even if the IPCB in its current structure is not perfect, the International Community 
needs to be better co-ordinated and should use this tool. 
 
4. EUPOL Afghanistan 
In the middle of 2006 the EU became more interested in playing a bigger role in the police 
reform efforts in Afghanistan. At that time it was obvious that the overall coordination was an 
issue that could only be solved if most of the bilateral projects came under one umbrella.  
European countries have run a lot of these bilateral projects. The hope was to unite the efforts 
under EUPOL by putting them under one chain of command.   
The way to the Mission 
• November and December 2006 the EU Fact-Finding Mission took place consisting of 
political advisers, police, logistics and administration experts from the Council of the 
European Union, representatives from the German Ministries of Interior and Foreign 
Affairs and a representative from the GPPO 
• Feb 12, 2007 decision to launch EUPOL Afghanistan Mission (Crisis Management 
Concept) 
• March 23, 2007 UNSC Resolution 1746 welcoming EUPOL AFG 
• Apr 23, 2007 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
• May 16, 2007 Letter of Invitation from GoA 
• June 15, 2007 EUPOL AFG launched 
• June 17, 2007 official inauguration ceremony in Kabul 
Mission Mandate 
• Contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective civil policing 
• Ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system  
• Under Afghan ownership 
• In accordance with international standards (including HR) 
• Keeping with the policy advise and institution building of EC, Member States and 
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other international actors 
Deployment 
The current mission strength is 281 and 163 nationals.  
The internationals consist of  
• 167 police officers,  
• 31 Rule of Law experts,  
• 83 civilian experts 
EUPOL Afghanistan is still lacking personnel. The target size is 400 police officers and 
civilian experts. 
The biggest contingent is the German with 27 police officers and 17 civilians. 
The current Head of Mission is the high-ranking Danish police officer Kai Vittrup. 
The 281 internationals are deployed as follows:  
• 189 at the EUPOL HQ in Kabul (including five assigned to the International Police 
Coordinating Board, IPCB Secretariat),  
• 87 in the regions,  
• 5 within the Mission Support Element in Brussels. 
Experiences 
In the beginning staffing was a big issue. During the first weeks there was just the German 
staff from the former GPPO in place. There was a lack of administrative and logistic staff that 
made it complicated to start working. In addition the signing of the Technical Agreements 
(TA) with the PRT nations was pending which resulted in a postponed deployment to the 
regions.  
Furthermore, there was a long discussion within the Council of the European Union as to 
whether the EUPOL staff was allowed to train Afghan police officers by itself or whether 
they were only allowed to support the training of others. Today EUPOL has its own trainers 
who train the Afghan police forces in co-operation with other supporters. 
Another shortfall lies in the ESDP System. An ESDP mission is not able to finance projects 
like equipment or construction projects. The budget covers only the costs of the mission itself 
and personnel costs. That leads to the fact that the mission is dependent on donors to finance 
such projects. Thus some of the bilateral projects, like the German GPPT, became bigger than 
before and the international co-ordination is still an issue. It would be good for the mission to 
have an own project budget to accomplish quick impact projects. This would make the 
mission more independent from other donors and it would show immediate success to the 
Afghan partners and the mission’s staff. The EU is currently discussing the topic to enable 
ESDP missions in general to finance small training, equipment and construction projects from 
the mission budget. 
EUPOL’s Strategy  
EUPOL is going to focus on 6 tasks for the mission: 
• Developing a overall structure for the Afghan police (chain of command and reporting 
system), 
• Optimise information gathering and information management, 
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• Build up criminal investigation structures, 
• Fight corruption, 
• Improve the co-operation and information flow between police and prosecution, 
• Make sure that the police pay attention to human rights and women rights within the 
police and in relation to the people. 
 
5. German Police Project Team 
Staff 
The German Police Project Team (GPPT) was set up at the launch of EUPOL Afghanistan on 
June 15, 2007. It replaced the GPPO but without the task of the overall co-ordination of the 
police reform in Afghanistan. This task devolved to EUPOL Afghanistan. Therefore, the 
GPPT was rather small in the beginning. Only 10 police officers served in the GPPT, 
deployed in Kabul and in the North. 
Due to the facts that the EUPOL Afghanistan cannot finance training, equipment and 
construction projects the GPPT has grown up very fast to complement the EUPOL efforts. 
Currently there are about 120 police advisers and training experts. 
The training experts conduct training at the Police Academy Kabul, in the area of the 
Regional Command North and take part in the Focused District Development Program (FDD). 
The goal is to increase the number of police advisers and training experts up to 200 until mid 
2010. 
The GPPT is composed of 
• Long-term experts   – deployed for 12 months, 
• Short-term experts   – deployed for 6 weeks up to 12 weeks, 
• FDD mentors    – deployed for 11 months. 
The use of short-term experts for the training programs has made recruiting German police 
officer to serve in Afghanistan a lot easier. The short-term experts enter Afghanistan about 1 
week before the training starts and leave again about 1 week after finishing the training. 
Between the trainings they stay in Germany fulfilling their normal duties. Due to this system 
the police officers are only separated from their families for a few weeks and the family 
situation is much better to handle. Furthermore, support by the home police forces has 
increased because the police officers are not absent from duty for one year. Thus it is much 
easier to compensate for the missing colleague.  
Training 
The training has been conducted in Police Training Centres (PTC) built by Germany. 
Currently Germany runs the following PTC  
• Mazar-e Sharif, finished October 2009, with a capacity of 400 trainees 
• Kunduz, finished November 2009 with a capacity of 100 trainees 
• Feyzabad, finished December 2009, with a capacity of 100 trainees 
• Kabul, will be finished in spring 2010, with a capacity of 100 trainees 
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The goal is to provide a capacity of 1,000 trainees. 
In 2009 Germany provided training for 3,500 police officers and additional 500 officers under 
the FDD program. 
In 2010 the GPPT will focus on 
• FDD, 
• Basic police training, 
• Train the Trainer courses, 
• Advanced and specialised trainings (e.g. border policing, criminal investigations). 
Focused District Development (FDD) 
The FDD is a US led program covering all of Afghanistan. Germany has taken over the 
responsibility in some districts of the area of the Regional Command North where the German 
Army (Bundeswehr) is deployed. Germany is conducting the FDD cycles on its own without 
being merged with US staff.  
A FDD cycle needs about 10 months: 
• District assessment   8 weeks 
• Substitute district police for ANCOP  2 weeks 
• Training of district police in a RTC  8 weeks 
• Exchange district police and ANCOP back  1 week 
• Close mentoring with Police Mentoring Team (PMT) 12 weeks 
• Part time mentoring with Province-PMT  12 weeks 
One PMT is composed of 4 German police officers and 4 German military police officers and 
if necessary additional security forces from the German Army. 
The FDD program seems to be successful. The first feedback from the mentors is optimistic. 
The district police forces accept the program and the organisation of the first cycles went well. 
A good side effect is that the well-trained ANCOP who substitute the district police during 
their training demonstrate how a well-trained and equipped police can and should act. This 
creates expectations within the society, on which the Afghan police will be assessed.  
The goal of the German commitment to the FDD program is to train 40 districts with 50 
PMTs in the North of Afghanistan till 2012.  
Infrastructure and equipment projects 
The GPPT is also financing equipment and construction projects. Some of these projects are 
related to the training or to the FDD activities. Some of these projects are really complex and 
run over several months or years, e.g. the Border Police Faculty inside the Police Academy, 
which has already been initiated under the GPPO. 
The GPPT will finish the following projects in 2010: 
• Border Police faculty Kabul with a capacity of 500 trainees, 
• Police Headquarters in Feyzabad, 
• Traffic Police Headquarters in Kabul, 
• ANCOP Headquarters in Kabul, 
• Field office of the Police Academy Kabul in Mazar-e Sharif with a capacity of 500 
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trainees for non commissioned officers 
• Border Police Building at Kabul International Airport 
In addition to these big projects the GPPT has carried out several small infrastructure and 
equipment projects that have often been accomplished in close co-operation with EUPOL 
Afghanistan and other partners.  
 
6. Preparation of German police officers to serve in Afghanistan 
All of these projects, trainings, mentoring and advising require highly qualified staff to fulfil 
their duties. Therefore, Germany has a comprehensive assessment and training system to find 
the right persons and to give them a good preparation for this difficult and dangerous job. In 
Afghanistan the colleagues work in an unknown culture with different rules of behaviour and 
under working conditions they are not used to. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to provide 
them with an intensive training. 
To work in Afghanistan the colleagues have to pass three steps: 
Assessment centre  1 day 
 
- police skills, 
- language skills, 
- personal competence. 
 
Generic peacekeeping course 2 weeks 
 
- UN English and fitness test,  
- different mandates UN, EU, OSCE,  
   bilateral projects, 
- UN CPTM (Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials) and  
  STM (Standardized Training Modules), 
- Mission route. 
 
Afghanistan Preparation Seminar 31/2 weeks  
 
1 week theoretical basics 
  - Intercultural competence, 
  - history, geography, culture and society of Afghanistan, 
  - briefings on security, equipment, administration issues... 
 
3 days tactical first aid 
 
1 week UN Training Centre of German military (Bundeswehr) 
  - training and shooting with G36 rifle, 
  - Counter IED, 
  - hostage-taking training, 
  - joint situation trainings together with German military. 
 
1 week situation trainings and driving training  
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 with armoured cars. 
The training is continuously evaluated and adapted. The reason for this is the volatile 
environment in Afghanistan. In the beginning of the Afghanistan training it was only a 1-
week training but with the deteriorating security situation it was necessary to extend the time 
first to 2 weeks, later to 3 weeks and currently to 3 and a half weeks. At the moment there are 
plans for another extension to 4 weeks. 
Furthermore, the German Police has opened the Afghanistan preparation courses for police 
officers from other countries and for civilian staff designated for to serve in Afghanistan. 
 
7. Way ahead of Germany’s commitment to the Reform of the Afghan police forces 
Germany is going to increase its commitment to the reform of the Afghan police forces. The 
Focus will be on 
• Training, 
• FDD, 
• the build-up Afghan training capacities, 
• increasing the number of German police officers and civil experts  
in the bilateral project to 200, 
•  increasing the number of German staff inside EUPOL Afghanistan  
to approx. 60, 
• improving the co-operation between police and justice with focus  
on prosecution. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The security situation is the key if the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan and the 
International Community to stabilise the country are to be successful. A stable security 
situation is the prerequisite for governmental, economical and social development.  
Thus the results of the Afghanistan Conference in London on January 28, 2010 are very 
important for the future of Afghanistan. During the London Conference Germany announced 
to increase its commitment providing more military and police staff and higher donations to 
several programs like the program to support Taliban fighters who want to renounce their 
commitment to the movement and get out of this group (reconciliation process). 
It is common sense to put more emphasis on the training of Afghan military and police forces 
to reach the authorised numbers and to give them the ability to fulfil their duties. The goal 
should be to enable the Afghan security forces as soon as possible to provide the nation’s 
security on their own. The NATO also started a new program to support the police training, 
the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan. This program will combine NATO’s and CSTC-
A’s efforts for police training. With this program there is a new player on the ground. 
Therefore, a functioning co-ordination of the International Community is a precondition for 
the success of the police reform in Afghanistan.  
The discussion about an exit strategy is necessary to set a realistic timeline, to demonstrate 
that the support of the International Community is not an everlasting project and to underline 
that the Afghan Government has to take over its responsibilities.  
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For sure, there is the strong need for a strengthened commitment of the International 
Community regarding the security of the country. But to focus only on the security and to 
provide only more troops and support for the military and the police might not be the right 
way. To improve the security situation is of the utmost importance, but without 
accompanying measures supporting economical and social development we will not be 
successful. 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                                                      Discussion Paper: 10-02 
 
 
20 
References 
• “Deutsches Engagement beim Wiederaufbau der afghanischen Polizei”. Federal 
Foreign Office, 
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afgh
anistanZentralasien/Polizeiaufbau-dt-Engagement.html. Retrieved 2010-01-05 
• “Assistance in rebuilding the Afghan police force”. Federal Ministry of Interior. 
http://www.en.bmi.bund.de/nn_1165434/Internet/Content/Themen/Police/Afghanista
n/DataAndFacts/Einfuehrung__Aufbauhilfe__Afghanistan__en.html. Retrieved 2010-
01-05 
• “Assistance in rebuilding the police force in Afghanistan”, Federal Foreign Office and 
Federal Ministry of Interior. March 2004 
• “Assistance for rebuilding the police force in Afghanistan”. Federal Foreign Office 
and Federal Ministry of Interior. December 2005 
• “European Security and Defence Policy – EUPOL Afghanistan”. European Union. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp. Received 2010-01-06 
• „Afghanistan. Auf dem Weg zur „Übergabe in Verantwortung,  
Ressortübergreifende Entscheidungsgrundlage zur Mandatsverlängerung und vor der 
internationalen Afghanistan Konferenz“. Kabinettsbeschluss vom 18. November 
2009. 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/856996/publicationFile/53541/entsc
heidungsgrundlage.pdf. Retrieved 2010-01-05 
• „The Federal Government’s Afghanistan Policy“. Federal Foreign Office, Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 9 September 2008 
http://www.en.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Themen/Afghanistan/
Afghanistan__Konzept__en,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Afghanista
n_Konzept_en.pdf. Retrieved 2010-01-06 
• EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, Factsheet. European Union. July 2009 
• http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/090708%20
FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2015_EN.pdf. 
Retrieved 2010-01-07 
• EUPOL Afghanistan Web Page 
http://www.eupol-afg.eu/. Retrieved 2010-01-07 
• Afghanistan - Konferenz "UN Talks on Afghanistan", Bonn, November 
2001, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/Kon
ferenzPetersberg2001,navCtx=246842.html, retrieved 2010-01-05 
• Übereinkommen über vorläufige Regelungen in Afghanistan bis zur 
Wiederherstellung dauerhafter staatlicher Institutionen, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/Vere
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                                                      Discussion Paper: 10-02 
 
 
21 
inbarungAfg.pdf, retrieved 2010-01-05 
•  “NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan”. Combined Security Transition Command – 
Afghanistan. 
http://www.cstc-a.com/. Retrieved 2010-01-07 
• “NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan”. NATO,  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52802.htm. 2010-01-07 
• “Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik?”. 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und 
Sicherheit, Muriel Asseburt/Ronja Kempin (Hg.). December 2009 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                                                      Discussion Paper: 10-02 
 
 
22 
Abbreviations  
AIA Afghan Interim Authority 
ANA Afghan National Army (Afghanische Armee) 
ANBP Afghan National Border Police  
ANCOP Afghan National Civil Order Police 
ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
ANP Afghan National Police (Afghanische Polizei)  
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces 
CID Criminal Investigation Department 
CNPA Counter Narcotics Police Afghanistan 
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 
DDR Disarmament, Demilitarisation and Reintegration  
EC European Commission 
EU European Union 
EUPOL European Police Mission in Afghanistan  
EUSR European Union Special Representative 
FDD Focused District Development 
GoA Government of Afghanistan 
GO Governmental Organisation 
GPPO German Police Project Office 
GPPT German Police Project Team 
INL International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (US) 
IPCAG Interagency Police Coordinating Action Group  
IPTC International Police Coordination Board 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
JCMB Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
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OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PMT Police Mentor Team 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PTC Police Training Center 
RC-N Regional Command North (ISAF)  
TA Transitional Authority 
UNAMA  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNDC United Nations Development Corporation 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services 
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Annex I Chronology 
 
Dec 5, 2001 UN Afghanistan Conference held at Petersberg near Bonn (1st Petersberg 
Conference) 
Dec 22, 
2001 
Hamid Karzei officially nominated as Chair of a six-month interim 
government 
Feb 13, 
2002 
1st Donors Conference in Tokyo 
Mar 13, 
2002 
2nd Donors Conference in Berlin, Federal Government resolves to set up a 
project office to rebuild the Afghan police force 
Mar 15, 
2002 
The Seat and Status Agreement to set up a police project office and the 
agreement to grant training assistance and equipment aid for the police 
force signed by the MoI and the MoI of the interim government of 
Afghanistan 
Apr 3, 2002 The German Police in Kabul (GPPO) commences work 
Apr 18, 
2002 
King Mohammad Zaher Shah returns from exile 
May 17, 
2002 
3rd Donors Conference in Geneva 
Jun 11, 2002 Convention of the Emergency Loya Jirga: decision to set up an interim 
government for 18 months, Hamid Karzai elected president (13 June) 
Aug 24, 
2002 
Police Academy in Kabul reopens 
Dec 1, 2002 2nd Petersberg Conference 
Mar 12, 
2003 
Cabinet decision to extend running of the GPPO in Kabul until 31 
December 2005 and to increase staffing (17 police advisers) 
Mar 28, 
2003 
UN Security Council Resolution 1471: to extend the UN mandate in 
Afghanistan by another 12 months 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                                                      Discussion Paper: 10-02 
 
 
25 
Apr 7, 2003 Presidential decree on police reform: sole competency of the Ministry of 
the Interior for internal security and the border police; delimiting the duties 
of the army and the intelligence service, desired number of police officers: 
50,000 
Oct 6, 2003 NATO decision to lift limitation on ISAF activities to Kabul and environs 
Oct 13, 2003 UN Security Council Resolution 1510 to expand and extend the ISAF 
mandate 
Oct 24, 2003 German Bundestag approves continuation and expansion of Germany’s 
commitment to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan 
(preceded by a relevant cabinet decision on 15 October). 
Jan 4, 2004 New Afghan constitution approved by the Constitutional Loya Jirga 
Mar 31–  
Apr 01, 
2004 
International Conference on Afghanistan in Berlin 
May 
18./19,2004 
Doha I-Conference on Police Reconstruction in Afghanistan in Doha/Qatar 
The participants were the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries, the EU as well as the other lead nations 
USA, UK, Italy and Japan. They adopted the Doha Declaration on 
Regional Police Cooperation. Furthermore, they agreed on a donation of 
$ 350 million for rebuilding the Afghan police forces between 2004 and 
2006. 
Oct 9, 2004 Election of Hamid Karzai for President of Afghanistan in free elections 
Sep 18, 
2005 
Afghanistan: Parliament and Provincial Council Elections 
Dec 7, 2005 Germany: Cabinet decision to continue and extend Germany’s commitment 
to assistance in rebuilding the police force in Afghanistan 
Dec 19, 
2005 
Afghanistan: First Parliamentary Meeting 
2006- Implementation of a comprehensive organisational reform of the ANP with 
a target strength of 62.000 police officers including 12.000 Afghan 
National Border Police (Tashkeel) 
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Feb 27/28, 
2006 
Doha II-Conference on “Border Management in Afghanistan – A Regional 
Approach” in Doha/Qatar  
20 participating countries and 8 international organisations that had 
followed the invitation of the Ministers of the Interior of Germany and 
Afghanistan agreed on a “Doha II-Declaration on Border Management in 
AFG - a regional approach”; Afghanistan and its neighbours China, Iran, 
Pakistan and Tajikistan signed an agreement on closer cooperation in 
border police matters; participants pledged € 33 million for border police 
projects and € 36 million for the LOTFA paying salaries of ANP 
Apr 2006 Dubai I-Conference - International Police Conference 
Oct 2006 Dubai II-Conference - International Police Conference  
Nov/Dec 
2006 
EU-Fact-Finding Mission in Afghanistan 
Feb 12, 
2007 
EU decision to launch EUPOL Afghanistan Mission 
May 2007 Decision to expand the total strength of ANP to 82.000 (JCMB Annual 
Report, Kabul 1st May 2007) 
Jun 15, 2007 Official launch of EUPOL Afghanistan (Inauguration Ceremony on 17 Jun 
2007) 
Jun 15, 2007 GPPO changed to GPPT (German Police Project Team), strength up to 10 
police officers, for financing, planning and implementation of projects (e.g. 
equipment-/reconstruction aid and training) 
Jun 12, 2008 International Afghanistan Conference in Paris 
Mar 31, 
2009 
International Afghanistan Conference in Den Haag 
Jan 28, 2010 International Afghanistan Conference in London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
